Modern products frequently feature monitors designed to detect actual or impending malfunctions. False alarms (Type I errors) or excessive delays in detecting real malfunctions (Type II errors) can seriously reduce monitor utility. Sound engineering practice includes physical evaluation of error rates. Type II error rates are relatively easy to evaluate empirically. However, adequate evaluation of a low Type I error rate is difficult without using accelerated testing concepts, inducing false alarms using artificially low thresholds and then selecting production thresholds by appropriate extrapolation as outlined here. This acceleration methodology allows for informed determination of detection thresholds and confidence in monitor performance with substantial reductions over current alternatives in time and cost required for monitor development.
INTRODUCTION
Many products today include on-board diagnostics (OBDs) designed to detect actual or impending malfunctions and to alert the user when maintenance is required; see Box et al. [1] and CARB [2] . Typically, monitoring algorithms consist of real time processing of a stream of incoming data, for example with a cumulative sum (Cusum) or an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), and setting an alarm when an appropriate statistic exceeds a threshold, h. A key issue in the design of monitors is, however, that diagnostics may fail to detect a real malfunction in a timely fashion, a Type II error, or report a malfunction when none exists, a false alarm or Type I error; see Box et al. [3] .
Error rates can often be evaluated from theory. However, the assumptions required for the theory will always be violated to some degree. Sound engineering practice therefore calls for additional direct physical verification (a) to confirm that violations of assumptions are negligible and (b) in many cases to refine estimates of theoretical model parameters in hopes of compensating adequately for violations of assumptions. For Type II errors this is relatively simple: A malfunction is artificially produced and the monitor's response observed. Unless the monitor responds quickly and consistently, it must be modified. Thus empirical evaluation of Type II errors can be done relatively inexpensively and will not be discussed in this article.
Empirical evaluation of the Type I error rate is more challenging. Ideally multiple copies of the plant would be tested for the entire design life. (In this article, the system monitored will be called the "plant", for consistency with the control theory literature.)
Such testing would far exceed any reasonable budget. Fortunately, in many cases As we will illustrate below, a relationship between parameters of the run length distribution and the process parameters can serve a role for accelerated testing of monitors similar to Arrhenius or Eyring relationships for testing materials.
We can often record the time to failure under stressed conditions with less time and money than would be required to observe a lifetime of normal use of a product. In this article we will describe methods for accelerated testing of monitoring systems with specific emphasis on threshold selection and false alarm rate estimation.
THRESHOLD SELECTION
As an introduction to our proposals for accelerated testing of monitoring systems, we will first discuss the selection of thresholds for triggering alarms. In general terms, alarm thresholds are selected to balance the probability of an excessive delay against the probability of a false alarm. Figure 1a shows the conceptual relationship between the threshold, h, the probability of a false alarm and an excessive delay for setting a valid alarm. As illustrated in this graph, increasing the threshold reduces the probability of a false alarm while increasing the probability of an excessive delay. Ideally the threshold is selected such that both error rates are sufficiently low.
(Figure 1 about here)
However, in practice complete separation as exemplified in Figure 1a is not always possible. Figure 1b represent a situation where there is no clear separation. For such cases a compromise must be made between the probabilities of a false alarm and an excessive delay.
Conceptually, threshold selection requires an evaluation of the consequences ("cost") of an excessive delay versus a false alarm. Different applications require different compromises. In the automotive context roughly 100 − 150 OBDs are running simultaneously all tied to a single malfunction indicator light (MIL). Thus a false alarm problem caused by one monitor may raise questions about all. To avoid "teaching" the driver to ignore the MIL, the false alarm rate for the individual monitor must be a small fraction of one percent in the design life of the plant. Thus this is an application where the Type I error rate must receive serious attention to avoid negating the original intent of the monitoring scheme.
An implantable defibrillator designed to detect and interrupt excessive heart rate (tachycardia) exemplifies the opposite extreme. A false alarm (Type I error) implies that the patient gets an unnecessary and uncomfortable but not life threatening electric shock to the heart. However, an excessive delay to detect a problem, a Type II error, may mean that tachycardia proceeds uninterrupted to patient death (Gunderson [7] ). The point here is that the design targets for Types I and II error rates will vary with the application and will likely not be the same for an implantable defibrillator as for automotive emission controls.
A MATHEMATICAL BASIS FOR ACCELERATED TESTING
A major challenge associated with testing the performance of a monitor is how to reliably estimate the false alarm rate (Type I error) across the entire design life.
Conceptually, the smaller the false alarm rate, the fewer actual events will likely occur in a given test period, and the longer the process must be observed to validate compliance with design targets. Further, the smaller the false alarm rate, the larger the relative uncertainty associated with any estimate of it.
Lai [8] reported that the distributions of run lengths to false alarms for generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) are often approximately exponential. This is consistent with our own unpublished simulation studies of algorithms like Cusums, EWMAs and 2-in-a-row of both independent and autocorrelated observations. Thus, for the examples considered in this article, we shall assume that the probability of a false alarm before time t is
where R = mean time to a false alarm. We will denote the false alarm rate } Pr{ t T ≤ with π.
between the average run length R, the threshold h, and a vector of process parameters ) , ,
This relationship can then be the basis for developing accelerated testing schemes.
Specifically, we can test a monitoring system under "stressed" conditions, where for example the threshold is lowered or process parameters are changed. The results of this testing can be used to estimate one or more components of θ, which are then used with the relationship ) , ( θ h R R = to predict the average run length under normal conditions. [9] provided an asymptotic approximation for R, later modified by Reynolds [10] and Siegmund [11] given by
where h a = h + 1.166, h is the threshold, and μ is the mean of the observations Cusummed, rescaled to standard deviation 1 = σ ; for μ = 0, R(h, μ) is defined by the appropriate limit. (Graves et al. [12] present refinements of
This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 2 . Of particular importance for accelerated testing, notice that for 0 < μ (i.e. "good" vehicles), small changes in h produce very large changes in R.
(Figure 2 about here)
Now suppose the data coming from a "good" prototype system has been rescaled to
, which made the mean of the input signal 2 − = μ . We also assume that for a "good" system, μ will not change over time. To achieve a design goal of a false alarm rate less than 1% in the t 1 = 100,000 mile design life of the plant, an engineer considers setting the threshold at h = 3.4. With one observation per mile, this implies using (2) that 000 , 700 , 10 ≈ R . Next, using (1) we find that the probability of a false alarm in t 1 = 100,000 miles with one observation per mile will be π 1 ≈ 0.0092. . Although we assumed in (2) that we could rescale the data to σ = 1, our procedure includes provisions for estimating a value for σ different from 1 in a way that will hopefully compensate adequately for violations of assumptions such as dependence between observations and nonnormality. The resulting σˆ would not be the standard deviation of the dependent, nonnormal observations we have but of hypothetical, independent normal observations for which the monitor would have essentially the same run length distribution.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCELERATED TESTING
As indicated above, accelerated testing of monitors for empirical estimation of a false alarm rate is based on data from the actual system under "stressed" conditions. The base for the acceleration is knowledge of an approximate relationship ) , ( θ h R R = between the average run length, the threshold h and the process parameters θ so we can predict what the average run length will be under both normal and accelerated conditions.
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Typically the process parameters θ will be the mean and the variance of the data generating process.
These considerations lead to three different modes of extrapolation that can be used in accelerated testing for OBD:
1. Threshold: Extrapolate from artificially low thresholds required to induce false alarms during a test period, h 0 , to production thresholds, h 1 , at which few "good" plants will generate false alarms in the design life. Traditional accelerated testing increases stress (here threshold) to reduce time. We add condition to reduce the gap between the beautiful models and the messy realities with which all practical engineers must work.
We will now elaborate further on these three modes of acceleration.
Variations in Detection Thresholds
As mentioned with (1), the exponential distribution provides a reasonable approximation to the run length distributions of many monitors even with serially autocorrelated observations under constant good conditions of the plant. Certain patterns of deterioration might give this run length distribution an increasing hazard rate, possibly With automobiles, observations will usually be serially dependent, non-normally distributed and have non-constant variance. Research by Bagshaw and Johnson [9] suggests that the average run length for the Cusum of autocorrelated normal observations can be adequately modeled by assuming independent, normally distributed observations by appropriately adjusting σ. The work of Siegmund [11] seems to suggest that further adjustments of σ might similarly compensate for nonnormality. Also, transformations can often reduce simultaneously inhomogeneity of variance and nonnormality.
Based on these considerations it seems reasonable to assume for a broad class of problems that we can obtain an approximate relationship ) , ( θ h R R = between the average run length R, the threshold h and process parameters θ . The process parameters will typically be the mean μ and the standard deviation σ so that R = R(h, μ , σ ). The probability of a false alarm for μ = a constant good condition in a time period t is then
. This expression then summarizes for a given σ the effect on the probability of an alarm for h = threshold, μ = condition of the plant, and t = time. For accelerated testing of monitors we want to extrapolate Pr{T < t | h, μ , σ} from t = t 0 to t = t 1 , from test thresholds 0 h to production thresholds 1 h , and from the actual condition 0 μ during testing, etc.
Whatever run length distribution we use, we are primarily interested in the lower tail of the lifetime distribution and are largely unconcerned with whether the upper tail of the distribution is accurately characterized. This helps justify estimating R from censored moreover, this discrepancy could only be detected with substantial observations in that lower tail, and these would be difficult to obtain prior to commercialization without accelerated testing and goodness of fit tests using likelihood for censored observations.
Variation in the Condition of the Plant
In the OBD context, it is frequently reasonable to assume that the condition of the plant is adequately characterized by the mean μ of that condition and estimated by a short-term average of observations for that parameter. This condition can vary from good to bad as illustrated in Figure 3 In the automotive context, the condition μ exhibits two types of variability.
First, different units at the end of the production line will differ due to production variability. Second, a given unit will also exhibit wear over its entire useful life.
Moreover, there will typically be substantial variation between units in the pattern of deterioration over time. In Figure 4 we illustrate symbolically the life trajectories for A key issue is the selection of the test period t 0 . Meeker and Escobar [5] note that reducing t 0 will tend to (a) increase the sensitivity of the analysis to deficiencies in the model used for extrapolation, and (b) amplify the effect of sampling variability. They In the next section we will describe more specifically how accelerated testing for OBD is organized. Figure 5 summarizes hypothetical 10,000 mile testing at six different thresholds, h = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, and 3, at which 28, 16, 7, 3, 1 and 0 false alarms were recorded at the mileages indicated in the plot. These data could be collected in at least two different ways. Either the raw data from a single unit could be processed in parallel against several different thresholds or several units could be tested with different thresholds. In either case, each time a monitor exceeds its threshold, appropriate data are stored and the monitor is reinitialized.
ORGANIZING ACCELERATED TESTING FOR OBD

(Figure 5 about here)
In the next section, we illustrate our methodology assuming for simplicity that the only data available were the top three lines of Figure 5 , for h = 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0. These are shown in Figure 6 . We see that at h = 3.0, no false alarms were observed in the 10,000 miles. Thus, this one observation was censored at 10,000 miles. We write this as Similarly, at h = 2.0, false alarms were observed at 2,760, 5,768, and 9,272 miles.
We denote these t 2,1 = 2,760, t 2,2 = 5,768 -2,760 = 3,008, and t 2,3 = 9,272 -5.768 = 3,504. No failures were observed in the remaining 728 of the 10,000 mile testing, which we denote as We will assume that these run lengths are all statistically independent. This assumption would be violated if the run lengths to different thresholds were obtained from monitors using different thresholds processing data from the same test unit. For example, two runs of 100 observations each with a threshold of 1 might be generated from the same observations that produced a run of 200 observations against a threshold of 2. Clearly, there would be statistical dependence between these three run lengths, which will not be considered in the present article; we assume instead that each test unit employs only one threshold. (Of course, if a manufacturer had the capability to process all the data simultaneously against different thresholds, we would encourage that practice. If the effects of this dependency were found to be material, we would need to develop a more appropriate analysis methodology, possibly using Monte Carlo, e.g., Robert and Casella [14] and Carlin and Louis [15] . We would be negatively impressed with any statistician who would tell engineers to collect less data, just because they didn't know how to model the dependence!) successive runs to higher thresholds would necessarily employ observations that are farther apart and therefore presumably less serially dependent. For the present discussion, we assume that this effect is negligible.
Another issue is that even modest levels of serial dependence between successive observations can seriously distort the run lengths, and average run lengths in particular, of monitors (e.g., Cusums, EWMAs) computed from those numbers. In the present discussion, we assume that an alternative choice for the standard deviation of these observations can adequately compensate the existing level of serial dependence, as mentioned above in section 4.1. As previously stated, if any of these assumptions are considered inappropriate, the present methodology could be revised to simulate via Monte Carlo assumptions considered more appropriate.
A WORKED EXAMPLE
Monitors that trigger on the second observation in a row exceeding a threshold are sometimes legally prescribed and used in the automotive context. We shall assume that the run lengths in Figure 5 are run lengths to the second observation in a row exceeding a threshold. We do this largely to simplify the discussion of accelerated testing principles, because the theoretical properties for k-in-a-row monitors are better known and more easily described (see below) than for other monitors such as Cusums or EWMAs that may make more efficient use of data typically encountered in engineering applications.
As an example we will apply the accelerated testing methodology to a 2-in-a-row using the simulated data in Figure 6 .
In the automotive context often as many as 150 monitors run simultaneously tied to the same malfunction indicator light (MIL), with each testing for a different type of malfunction. If 50 of them were statistically independent with false alarm rates for each of 2% in the design life of the vehicle (while the false alarm rate for the other 100 were negligible), this would generate on average one false alarm per vehicle design life. To avoid this, we will therefore select a much smaller target false alarm rate of 0.0005 = 0.05%.
However, in applying this design target, we need somehow to consider variations in the condition of the plant, both between vehicles and for a given vehicle between the time that it is new to mature use. Many monitors exhibit behavior qualitatively similar to the Cusum approximation (2), where R decreases roughly exponentially as the condition of the plant μ becomes less negative, moving from "as new" towards "worst acceptable".
Because of this, we shall assume that only about half of the units spend any appreciable amounts of time near "worst acceptable", and that the probability of a false alarm for the other half can be ignored. Thus we will set the design target for the false alarm rate as We will assume that the input signals to the monitor are independent normally distributed observations with mean μ and standard deviation σ. The probability that a single independent observation will exceed the threshold h is therefore
where Φ[.] is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the normal distribution. shows that when p is small, i.e., when the condition of the plant is good, the standard deviation of T is approximately equal to the mean. This is a property of the exponential distribution and helps justify its use in this context. Thus for good plants (small p's), we will assume that the run length distribution is approximately exponential.
As noted above, we require the false alarm rate to be at most π 1 = 0.001. Since run length distributions for good plants are approximately exponential, this means that
After some algebra this inequality can be written as
When 1 π is small, which will be the case for this application,
. Thus this inequality is virtually equivalent to
Note that expression (5) applies to any monitor that has approximately an exponential run length distribution including the Cusum, the EWMA, and k-in-a-row. Note further that for our example with t 1 = 100,000 miles and π 1 = 0.001 the lower bound on the theoretical R is 100,000,000 miles. (The absurd magnitude of this number underscores the need for accelerated testing.)
We will now apply (5) to the 2-in-a-row example to find the threshold h. From (4), we have that R = ( ) ( )
. If R must be large, p must be small. Hence
. We combine this with (3) and (5) 
After a little algebra we get
To solve (6) for h we need estimates of μ and σ . We will assume for simplicity that the data are scaled to have mean μ = 0. As noted above, we will estimate σ for the observations indirectly from its impact, via (4) and (3), on the average run length data in Figure 6 . We do this using maximum likelihood. For an exponential distribution with mean R, the probability density for a run of length t is
and the probability that the run length exceeds a censoring time t c is given by Pr{T > t
Hence the log(likelihood) is
where ) , , (
is as given above. (Note that we have dropped the superscript "c" used to denote censoring times in Figure 6 and collapsed the two subscripts into one.) For the numbers in Figure 6 , we found that the likelihood was maximized at σˆ = 0.977.
We can get an approximate 95% confidence interval as When setting thresholds we want to be on the safe side providing an upper bound for the false alarm rate. Thus because R decreases with σ , we will use the upper bound for σ to obtain a lower confidence bound on the threshold required h. Hence we will use This lower bound for h adjusts for certain issues but not others. We explicitly considered the random variability in the data for the vehicles tested, but it may also be desirable to make a further adjustment for the between-vehicle component of variance.
Other modifications to our procedure would be possible if data were available to model how the mean and standard deviation of the observations change with age. We have assumed in the above that (a) the measurement standard deviation remains constant throughout the product life and (b) only the mean changes with age. For certain automotive catalyst monitors that rely on counts of "rich-to-lean" and "lean-to-rich" transitions in the exhaust gas downstream of the catalytic converter, the standard deviation also increases with age: When the catalyst is new, this number and its standard deviation are both quite small. As the catalyst ages, both the mean and the standard deviation increase. If this pattern could be modeled, more refined estimates of the false alarm rate could be developed. A simple step in this direction might be to monitor the square roots of switch counts, recalling that the square root is the traditional variance stabilizing transformation for Poisson counts. Even if these counts were not Poisson, this We have considered a procedure for estimating and controlling the false alarm rate. A separate analysis is needed to determine if the monitor considered in this example with a threshold of 4.46 will signal sufficiently fast for a best unacceptable (b.u.) plant.
We will not discuss this issue, except to note that it may not be appropriate to assume that the run length distribution is exponential for bad plants.
DISCUSSION
Several major automobile manufacturers currently spend large sums every year verifying that new vehicles will not have a major false alarm problem. Unfortunately, even with these substantial investments, they still have difficulties obtaining reasonable estimates of the false alarm rates for their monitors. This article has described a methodology that will allow organizations to evaluate false alarm rates more precisely than in the past, in less time for less money, while simultaneously doing a better job of establishing detection thresholds.
This reduction in cost and time to market requires the user to develop models to support the extrapolations discussed above: Adjusting for the fact that prototypes are generally better than worst acceptable (w.a.), adjusting for the difference in duration between the test period and the design life, and extrapolating from test to production thresholds. The methodology was described, and a hypothetical example was presented.
While this theory can be used to support a substantial reduction in the 100,000 mile testing of new vehicles performed by some automobile manufacturers, it would not be wise to eliminate completely the 100,000 mile testing. This is because an 8/2/05: 22 extrapolation methodology that works in some contexts may be inadequate in others. For example, the theory of statistical confidence intervals in expression (8) 
